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SYNOPSIS
Four processes occurring in and around organizations are propelling
strategic planning processes in many firms toward a state that may be termed
"hyper-rationality." This is a condition in which the entrepreneurial sprit
essential for planning is supplanted by rigidity, excessive quantification
and formality. Once hyper-rationality exists, the capacity of the planning
process to insure innovative adaptation is Lost. With this loss comes a dimin-
ished capacity of an organization for achieveing long-term competitive success
Both an alert executive group and certain administrative actions are necessary
to prevent the onset of hyper-rationality.

CRIPPLING EFFECTS OF "HYPER-RATIONAL" PLANNING
Quantification destroys the ideological cohesion of experience
and knowledge turns into a perversely empty thing; and it
soon becomes impossible to determine which scientist is doing
something significant and something trivial.
- Bernard James
The Death of Progress
It is widely recognized that successful strategic planning systems exhibit,
in one sense, a life of their own. That is, they change to both accommodate
and encourage the long-term growth and development of an enterprise. Not only
is it necessary that the overall structure, format and analytical procedures
change to facilitate growth and strategic diversity, it is quite desirable. In-
deed, without evolutionary adaptation of this sort a planning system can easilv
become an impediment to success.
As the use of strategic planning systems has become more widespread it is
increasingly clear that the evolution of such .systems must be carefully culti-
vated. This is due to the fact that the development of a planning system is
not a "natural" phenomenon. Rather, it is a socio-technical phenomenon that
may occur in "fits and starts" and take a variety of paths. Along the way, it
is vulnerable to any of a number of forces that can influence its capacity to
serve as a vehicle for organizational adaptation and growth.
Our basic thesis is that a variety of bureaucratic processes within organi-
zations and technological developments from without are propelling many plan-
ning processes toward a state we describe with the word "hyper-rationality."
By hyper- rationality , we refer to a condition in which the strategic planning
process has become inflexible, formalized, and excessively quantitative. In
this state, the planning system seems to develop an inertia all its own that
stifles creative thought and frustrates the most able managers. It appears
to be a major contributor to the disenchantment experienced by line and staff
members for whom planning has lost its glow.
HYPER-RATIONALITY: ITS BASIC CHARACTER AND ORIGINS
Nothing would be more comforting than to suggest that the tendency toward
hyper- rationality in a planning system stems from a single, invidious force.
If it were so, the problem would be easily recognizable and, probably, rather
straightforward to resolve. Unfortunately, it appears that this tendency has
multiple origins — none of which are abnormal in organizational life and all
of which occur over rather lengthy periods of time. Many independent deci-
sions and commitments made in the midst of daily administrative affairs collec-
tively result in the emergence of a hyper-rational state. Its early symptoms
are felt by managers who sense that the demands placed on them to plan are
excessive in terms of time requirements, and that creativity, innovation and
entrepreneurship are not rewarded. As one consultant noted when reporting
on the tension and frustration managers experience when the strategic planning
process goes awry:
Thank God it's over; now let's get back to work. This is my
third strategy review. Same damn outcome. Nothing resolved.
Every year we get together, fill in the forms -- some of which
don't evey fit my business (and the planning instruction manual
gets thicker by the year) , make a f.o-and-one-half-hour presen-
tation. We never ?et to the strategic issues. The discussion
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gets bogged down in nitpicking and number crunching; then we
simply run out of time. Nobody really cares what's in the
strategic plans. We must put on a good show, appear to be
innovative, and go through the ritual. What really counts
is the one-year operating budget. (4)
It would be misleading to suggest that either researchers, consultants,
or practitioners fully understand the constellation of forces that collec-
tively make a planning process a rigid, over bureaucraticized, annual ritual.
Precise answers to such questions will, undoubtedly, be forthcoming as more
field studies of organizations are undertaken. As it now stands, however, it
is clear that both basic administrative processes within most firms and tech-
nological developments from outside contribute to hyper-rationality. Figure 1
includes some of the more salient processes whose overall effect, if not guarded
against, is to generate inertia within the planning system toward a hyper-
rational state.
Take in Figure 1-
Any classification of such diverse processes is at this point somewhat
arbitrary. Nevertheless, the tendency toward hyper-rationality seems to be
manifested in: (1) the growing professionalization of the planner's job,
(2) the temptation to equate certainty in decision making with elaborate quan-
tification, (3) the institutionalization of planning over time, and (4) the
unqualified acceptance of sophisticated analytical techniques for strategy anal-
ysis. These processes influence each other in ways that can lead to a self-
perpetuating cycle of organizational momentum. Gaining some appreciation for
this requires more insight into each process.
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Professionalizing the Planner's Job
One of the most important processes, particularly during the last decade,
is the growth of planning as a profession. Both corporations and schools of
business have done much to single out strategic planning as a high-potential
career path. Fast-track programs in major business firms and university curri-
cular developments have contributed to an aura and attractiveness that make
careers in planning virtually irresistible. If popular business literature
were to be taken at face value, one would come to believe that the corporate
planner is a key influential who has the "king's ear" on every strategic deci-
sion.
A requirement for maintaining the professional mystique of planning is
to cast it into the mold of an exact science. With the help of academicians
and consultants this is precisely what has occurred. First came the necessary
jargon. Terms such as strategic business unit, growth-share matrix, and GAP
analysis became buzz words of the planning professional. These provided out-
ward and visible signs required to gain and sustain respectability in organiza-
tional life. Accompanying this special vocabulary are a variety of research
findings and analytical techniques reputed to reveal "laws" of the marketplace.
Armed with both an arcane language and special knowledge of lawful (i.e., pre-
dictable) strategic relationships, corporate planning has come to be a "scien-
tific" profession.
The hazards of permitting the planning function to gain professional and
scientific status in organizational life are manifold, and more will be said
of it later. What is worth noting at this point is that planners are first and
foremost staff. Therefore, they feel vulnerable with respect to their organiza-
tional status — particularly when going one-cn-one with strong line managers.
It should come as no surprise, then, that a safe harbor for the corporate
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planner is specialized knowledge and complex analytical procedures. These are
more than tools of the trade; they are independent bases of power for offset-
ting the prerogatives and stature of line executives and serve as means for
surviving the vagaries of corporate life.
Quantification Equals Certainty
A second process than can propel a planning system toward a state of hyper-
rationality is excessive emphasis on quantification. This emphasis is directed
at both (1) information used as inputs to the planning process and (2) the level
of detail embodied in the corporate plan itself. In each instance there oper-
ates an implicit belief that the level of quantification and certainty are
directly correlated.
At its core, strategic planning is simpl*-' a systematic approach for insur-
ing the long-term growth and development of an enterprise. Strategic planning
processes are usually introduced in order to rationalize corporate decision
making by moving away from seat-of-the-pants administrative judgments. One
unintended consequence of the need to become more systematic and rational is
the establishment of rules of evidence that govern the admissibility of infor-
mation used to establish planning assumptions. A pervasive belief among many
line and staff members is that only quantifiable data are sufficiently reliable
bases for planning. Other data, though interesting and certainly useful for
explaining empirical relationships, lack the "hardness" or certainty required
for planning. Beliefs of this sort are seldom expressed — nor do they have
to be in the give-me-the-facts world of administration. They greatly bias,
however, the scope and character of information used to plan. Critically im-
portant qualitative information, especially that regarding such intangibles as
subtle shifts in public attitudes, life-style changes, the ebb and flow of
organizational morale, corporate-government relations, etc., are frequently
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lost in the shuffle. Partly, this is because models for strategy analysis and
most management information systems can only accommodate numbers.
The desire of staff to establish solid planning assumptions is not the
only antecedent in the drive for quantification and certainty. Line managers
contribute, too. One of the most common phenomena in organizational life is
the direct correlation between the age of a planning system and the level of
detail used for analysis and exhibited in the strategic plan. There are excep-
tions, of course, but the tendency is for line managers to demand and receive
more detailed information each year for preparing plans. Corporate planners
are then expected to incorporate such detail into the plan itself. In circum-
stances with which we are familiar, the increasing emphasis on detail reflects
a continuing quest for certainty — a quest that in the end usually proves to
be a mirage. What managers often encounter with increasing levels of detail is
not greater certainty, but more ambiguity. As strategic problems are "sliced",
into smaller and smaller pieces, they become fragmented and disjointed. What
is lost is coherence.
Institutionalization of Planning
The third major process that can propel an organization toward a state of
hyper-rationality is institutionalization. Institutionalization is a process
in which new norms, values, and administrative procedures are incorporated into
the social fabric and structure of an organization (13) . Strategic planning
processes are subject to institutionalization. When first introduced into organ-
izational life, planning is often an exciting experiment that generates innova-
tive entrepreneurial thinking. As time passes, its novelty diminishes, and
its administrative efficiency improves, and it can become merely one more man-
agement task. Unfortunately, the dual forces 3f creative, innovative thinking
and efficient planning system management usually pull in opposite directions.
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The process of institutionalization causes many planning systems to become
efficient, elaborate, and formalized, but less innovative, flexible and stimu-
lating to strategic thinking. If institutionalization proceeds too far, a
planning process can become hyper-rational. Stress shifts from creativity to
compliance. The purpose of planning is reduced to that of simply struggling
through the annual planning cycle with its seemingly endless reporting proce-
dures, confusing forms, and rigid timetables.
Unqualified Acceptance of Analytical Techniques
Unqualified acceptance and application of sophisticated models and analyti-
cal techniques is a fourth process contributing to hyper-rationality in some
firms. Findings stemming from the PIMS Program (18), contributions from finance
concerning capital budgeting, the Boston Consulting Group's concept of portfolio
analysis (3), and recent outgrowths of industrial organization economics (16)
are milestones in strategic analysis. These and similar techniques are power-
ful tools for competitive analysis, but their function and limits are often
ignored in the quest for certainty in strategic decision making. Hyper-rationality
occurs when one or more of these techniques become the dominant framework for
defining and evaluating strategic choices. The following problems are typical
of this condition:
I. The particular analytical model used becomes a "filter" that frames
managerial thinking. In this mode the model's parameters and struc-
ture define strategic problems in such a way that the model can deal
with them. Thus, emerging, ill-defined strategic issues that often
prove decisive may not be detected because they either do not corre-
spond to variables in the model or fall outside its analytical scope.
In a sense, unqualified acceptance of a model for strategy analysis
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can seriously impair the capacity of an organization to spot problems
sufficiently well in advance to formulate and implement a response (2)
II. Many strategy analysis techniques place excessive emphasis on a
single criterion as the basis for strategic decision making. Both
the present value method and the Boston Consulting Group's portfolio
model are primarily concerned with cash flows. Their implication is
that the strategic significance of investment decisions and managing
a portfolio of diverse businesses is summarized by streams of cash.
For the executive, strategic choices are a complex, multidimensional
problem involving matters that cannot be incorporated by a single
measure. Unwarranted commitment to either of these or similar tech-
niques can lead to strategic errors biased by short-term financial
considerations that undermine the infrastructure of an organization
necessary to sustain it over the long run (1,3).
III. Proponents of particular analytical techniques usually make it a
point to remind potential users of the scope, limits and assump-
tions of each technique. Unfortunately, these are often ignored
at great risk. The PIMS findings, for example, are based on
product life cycle. Whether lawful relationships revealed in this
program hold under other circumstances is not known. Thus, general-
izing can be perilous. The portfolio model and experience curve
(which underpins the BCG portfolio matrix) also have limits (1,10,
11,12). Mana 2rs lulled into a false sense of security with these
models can wake up to find that competitors placing greater empha-
sis on product innovation are expanding into new markets with higher
rates of return. Hyper-rationality occurs when assumptions and
limits of analytical frameworks are ignored in strategic decision
making. '
_Q_
IV. Deterministic thinking often supplants entrepreneurial creativity
in strategy making. By this we mean when managers implicitly assume
that relationships specified by an analytical model are inevitable,
and result from irresitible economic and technological trends. For
example, some drawing on PIMS research argue that high profits are
the outcome of a large market share. Therefore, one should pursue
share. This is a case of over generalizing a deterministic relation-
ship. It ignores other factors such as profit margins, cost structure,
barriers to industry competitors, etc. The potency of these factors
is clear in the world of commerce which is replete with examples of
firms with small market share that are extremely profitable. Deter-
ministic thinking of this sort ignores two important facts: (1) models
are simplified analogs of reality, not reality itself; and (2) a
strategist's job is to invent a future for an organization that is
a unique expression of its history, values and resource capacity.
Deterministic thinking drives out this kind of creative thought.
The four processes presented in Figure 1 are primary sources of inertia
that can drive a planning system to the state we refer to as hyper-rationality
.
Certainly, not all firms experience these in the same proportion. Some never
experience them at all. The point is that such processes operate among evolu-
tionary developments that facilitate the normal adaptation of planning systems
as organizations grow. Hyper-rationality is an extreme case in which planning
systems become onerous, dysfunctional procedures that are incapable of produc-
ing innovation strategic thinking. Organizational consequences of this condi-
tion can be quite serious.
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ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF HYPER-RATIONAL PLANNING
Effects of the condition we have described as "hyper-rational" planning
are not localized. Rather, they affect persons in key roles throughout an
organization. Of particular importance are the chief executive officer, the
corporate planner, senior-level line managers, and board members. Each exper-
iences the effects somewhat differently and for this reason deserves individual
consideration.
Chief Executive Officer
There are tiro discernible effects on a chief executive when a planning
system reaches a hyper-rational state. First, the shifting pattern of people,
values, aspirations, and commitments that comprise the milieu of executive
action seem strangely irrelevant. The organization is discussed as if it
were an abstraction to be referenced by carefully defined strategic variables
and subject to immutable competitive laws. Intangible qualities of organiz-
tion sustaining its "social glue" and sense of collective purpose seem impo-
tent in the wake of empirical data a:~d the weight of statistically verified
relationships. A second effect of hyper-rationality concerns the role of the
chief executive. If strategy formulation is developed within the parameters
of a single model, the specification of strategy becomes merely a constrainted
choice problem. The executive's role is recast from that of institutional
leader to one of clerk: in lieu of inventing a future for the organization
is an annual endorsement of an inevitable course of action. Admittedly, these
effects are exaggerated. But the central point remains that a hyper-rational
planning process is devoid of meaning for many senior executives, due to its
incapacity to capture the multidimensional complexity of strategic choice.
When executives confront this situation they exhibit a variety of responses
,
Two of these are particularly detrimental to the success of the strategic
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planning process. One response is to withdraw support from and active parti-
cipation in the process. It goes without saying, that this seriously undermines
the integrity of the planning effort by giving mixed signals to other executives.
Without visible and enthusiastic support from the chief executive, strategic
planning is doomed to failure (14,17,19).
A second and equally destructive consequence of hyper-rational planning
is for the CEO to form a coterie of senior managers for making strategic deci-
sions. Such a group is usually comprised of certain key executives that
share basic values with the chief executive and possess a similar "view of
the world." Matters of real strategic significance are confronted and dealt
with by this group outside of the formal process of strategic planning. Rela-
tively mundane aspects of planning occur within prescribed channels. In
this situation the formal planning process can take on the role of a routine
annual exercise that affords little in the way of innovative thought. Few
other executive actions have a greater negative impact on the overall effec-
tiveness of the strategic planning than withdrawing visible support from this
process.
The Corporate Planner
Although to some it may seem ironic, corporate planners are often victims
of hyper-rational planning. In their effort to attain organizational respecta-
bility as vital contributors to strategic decision-making, the trappings of
the "science of planning" sometimes create a snare. The snare is slowly fash-
ioned out of the increasingly intricate network of models, data, analytical
techniques, and formal procedures. If the process goes too far, these factors
establish an intellectual cocoon of abstractions whose relationship to the
administrative experiences of line managers is, at best, tenuous. Increasing
sophistication can breed increasing irrelevance and the development of a
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ponderous planning apparatus. One planning officer we interviewed provided an
example of the case in point. Ivhen queried about his firm's strategic plan,
he placed before us a three-inch-thick ring binder containing, in seemingly
endless detail, the annual plan. He dubbed it "the beast"! Over sevev .i
years his full-time preoccupation had become coordinating the development of
the plan which was made more detailed and complex each year.
An organizational consequence of such circumstances is to prevent the
planner from acting as an otherwise creative agent in the planning process.
In place of internal consultant, counselor, and confidant to managers strug-
gling with tough strategic choices, the corporate planner becomes merely a
"gadfly" insuring that deadlines are met and procedures adhered to. The
process ceases to be an instrument, and becomes an end in itself. Administra-
tive success is equated with completing the plan on schedule and in the cor-
rect format. For the planner there is little time for creative analysis of
strategic opportunities sensed by line managers, since such projects are often
precluded by the formal demands of the planning system. Innovation suffers
as the planner's role changes from one of catalyst to one of weary coordina-
tor.
Senior Line Managers
By now it must be clear that line managers too are victims of hyper-rational
planning. They suffer at the hands of executive leadership when hyper-ration-
ality causes the CEO to withdraw from or by-pass the strategic planning process.
Such executive actions communicate contradictory signals to upper-level mana-
gers. In one breath they are reminded of the importance of strategic planning.
It is made clear that planning will require much of them and be rewarded if
well done. If, simultaneously, the CEO personally disengages from the planning
process, what are line managers to do?
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Under such circumstances, executives expected to conduct the planning pro-
cess experience role stress and feelings of ambiguity about planning (15)
.
These experiences often surface in the form of dysfunctional behaviors which
reduce the effectiveness of the planning process. Upper-level managers often
send the same mixed signals to subordinates that they have received from their
chief executive. Thus, the facade of planning is maintained while the substance
of planning is lost. There develops a mere chain of compliance. Managers at
all levels come to view the strategic planning process as the nearly unbear-
able annual ritual that in the end means little.
When the quality of participation in the planning process gravitates from
enthusiastic support to reluctant compliance, the capacity of the system to
facilitate adaptation is severely impaired. Missing are the priceless inputs
from line managers that help an organization sense out shifting environmental
contingencies. Early signals of strategic significance are ignored. Without
antennae ;f this sort, the corporation is, at least with respect to subtle
changes in competitive conditions, "flying blind." If the planning process
ceases to be a forum in which entrepreneurial thought and action are encour-
aged, ambitious, able managers are forced to find other outlets for their cre-
ativity. If these are not available, morale declines and a generation of
future executives are compelled to conclude that strategic planning is simply
another administrative burden they must bear while ascending the organizational
hierarchy.
Board Members
Board members are, perhaps, the most unwitting victims of hyper-rationality
in planning. This stems from the fact that they are usually trying to reach
an accommodation between two conflicting pressures that make board membership
difficult. One source of pressure is rising public expectations of a board
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nenber's responsibility for a corporation's strategic behavior (6). Such expec-
tations are reflected in a raft of litigation and the redefinition of directors'
liability and responsibility. A second source of pressure is the difficulty
even able bo.ird members have in comprehending the complexity and scope of cor-
porate actions. Many directors, despite good intentions, have an inadequate
understanding of both current strategy and broad issues affecting strategic
success.
To the besieged board member the appearance of certainty conveyed by a
hyper-rational planning process is alluring, indeed. Its pseudo-scientific
trappings provide a sense of stability and predictability in a world that
often appears turbulent. Armed with hyper-rational planning procedures, exec-
utives can bring to board members in simple "black and white" the relevant
array of strategic alternatives and the immutable logic supporting their cho-
sen course of action. If questions arise, staff can be summoned to deliver a
litany of arcane terminology and statistical mumbo jumbo sufficient to blunt
the most earnest inquiry. For the board member, hyper-rational planning can
become an opiate for coping with the stress of rising public expectations and
the increasing complexity of strategic choices.
If a planning system becomes hyper-rational and directors accept, with a
carefully concealed sigh of relief, the resulting strategic analysis, trouble
is afoot. Board members whose innate sensibilities are numbed by hyper-rational
planning have abnegated their personal responsibility and public duty. This
places all in jeopardy. Under such circumstances issues of fundamental stra-
tegic importance seldom surface for open discussion and debate. In the absence
of this vital administrative function an organization's executive group and
trustees can sleepwalk into the future. When a board is, in effect, anes-
thetized by hyper-rationality, how can its members judge executive action and
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flush out critical issues so often buried in the assumptions underpinning empir-
ical strategic analysis?
GUILDELINES FOR PREVENTING HYPER-RATIONAL PLANNING
The occurrence of hyper-rationality in strategic planning is a result of
a myriad of complex administrative and technical processes. However, these
processes are not inevitable in the sense that nothing can be done to arrest
momentum toward a hyper-rational state. At first blush, it may appear to be
fruitful to directly engage the sources of hyper-rationality presented in Fig-
ure 1. This approach, however, will probably yield only moaest results. In-
stead, our suggestion is to cake action on three broad fronts with the intent
of blunting the overall inertia toward hyper-rationality.
First, it is imperative that a planning culture be developed in which the
purpose and limits of strategic planning are widely recognized and fully under-
stood (4,5,7). This is a particularly important function of the chief executive
officer and corporate planner (14) . Persons must be reminded that the strategic
planning process is a means for the continual identification and interpretation
of strategic issues that may affect the long-term growth and development of an
enterprise. In this capacity, it should facilitate problem formulation, sensing
out of values and aspirations, consensus building, and settling on a strategy
consistent with a firm's strategic capability. In no sense, however, is stra-
tegy making an exact science. It is, instead, a combination of analytical tech-
niques, administrative processes, and human judgment that bear elements of both
art and science. With this in mind, executives must affect a synthesis between
analyses provided by limited, but powerful, techniques and equally important non-
quantifiable properties of an organization (e.g., knowledge, values, aspirations
and acknowledged societal responsibilities). Synthesis is impossible, however,
when hyper-rationality squeezes out intuition and seasoned judgment.
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Second, one mechanism for insuring that plans are well thought out is to
include in the planning process techniques for testing assumptions. Every stra-
tegy alternative and final strategic plan are underpinned by a host of assump-
tions. Some assumptions may stem from data used during analysis (e.g., interest
rates, GNP) . Other assumptions are peculiar to specific analytical techniques
(e.g., declining costs, cash flows, rates of technological innovation). If
assumptions in either of these areas are unwarranted, conclusions that result
are also likely to be unwarranted. In light of these circumstances, we suggest
that staff and line executives be encouraged to examine in considerable detail
assumptions supporting strategic alternatives facing a firm. Very often we
have found that deadlocks over which course of action is best can be clarified,
and sometimes resolved, by probing, critical examination of assumptions that
otherwise go unchallenged.
Finally, beyond cultivating essential organizational values and using
assumptions testing, a more formal procedure may be required to arrest the momen-
tum toward hyper-rationality in planning. We recommend periodic reviews of the
strategic planning process. These may be conducted by a task force comprised
of both participants in the planning process and those with no direct involve-
ment. The latter could be a consultant, an outside board member, or an exec-
utive from another firm or division. The team should develop review criteria
before initiating their evaluation. The following are some criteria for getting
started, which are by no means ali inclusive:
1. Do those engaged in the planning process understand its basic purpose
and structure?
2. Does the strategic planning process facilitate the identification and
interpretation of strategic issues?
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3. Is there a balance between quantitative and qualitative information
that sets the stage for innovative thought and action?
4. Given the utility of information obtained, is the time required t.o
gather and interpret it excessive?
5. Does the planning process provide means for fully discussing dissent-
ing viewpoints?
6. Are managers encouraged and rewarded for entrepreneurial initiatives?
7. Are intangibles such as managerial values, aspirations, and acknow-
ledged responsibilities society explicitly incorporated into final
strategic choices?
8. Does the process provide adequate time for strategy implementation and
evaluation?
CONCLUSION
We have suggested that four basic processes found in and around most organ-
izations can generate momentum that propels the strategic planning process toward
a state of hyper-rationality. The term hyper-rationality refers to a condition
that is present when a planning system becomes excessively rigid, formalized,
quantitative, and deterministic. Hyper-rationality does not arise suddenly, nor
are all organizations necessarily susceptible to its debilitating effects. Man-
agers in many firms recognize its early symptoms and take corrective action.
Other managers do not. As a result they suffer a decrease in the level of effec-
tiveness of their strategic planning process.
In order to lessen the inertia toward hyper-rationality, we suggest that
action be taken on three fronts. First, it is necessary to instill and culti-
vate organizational values about planning that put into perspective its purpose,
proper role, and limits. Second, assumptions testing procedures should be incor-
porated into the planning process. Finally, periodic reviews of the planning
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process could be vitally irnportant for arresting a drift toward hyper-rationality
,
If these st^ps are successful, they will contribute to the maintenance of a via-
ble planning process sufficient to insure continued adaptation to a changing
competitive environment.
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